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Abstract 
It has been demonstrated in recent studies by that wars occurred with 
greater frequency in Europe in periods of cold climate over the past 
millennium, and food scarcity is the explanation. However, the issue of 
whether the climate-war relationship holds consistently across the 
European continent has been insufficiently explored. In the present 
study, we seek to advance the macroscopic understanding of the 
climate-war association in Europe via the statistical analysis of fine-
grained paleo-climate and historical warfare data covering the period 
1400–1999, with a specific focus on how regional geographic factors 
mediate the association. Our statistical results show that the climate-war 
correlation varied across Europe. At multi-centennial time-scale, 
temperature-war correlation was stronger in Eastern Europe, in part 
because of the region’s greater dependence on agriculture and in part 
due to the region’s prevailing continental climate. At multi-decadal to 
centennial time-scale, the temperature-war correlation in Europe was 
periodically distorted when population pressure was unleashed via a 
significant decline in the rate of population growth or through 
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industrialization. Furthermore, the regional disparity in terms of 
population growth rate and pace of industrialization might be responsible 
for the diverse trends and trajectories of the temperature-war correlation 
in Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Our results may help to resolve 
some major controversies about the climate-conflict link. 
Keywords: climate change, land carrying capacity, population pressure, 
wars, violent conflicts, Europe 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, Europe has been the scene of many great and 
destructive wars that have ravaged both rural and urban areas, imposing 
enormous cost in human, economic and environmental terms [43, 58]. 
Scholars in various disciplines have sought to theorize the causes of wars. 
Historians cite government mismanagement and concomitant social turmoil; 
military scientists and politicians emphasize power imbalances among 
competing groups or entities; psychologists and biologists relate warfare to 
innate human aggressiveness; while Marxist theorists hold that warfare is the 
unavoidable consequence of class struggle [69, 70]. Under the paradigm of 
historical particularism, many scholars tend to deduce the fundamental 
causes of warfare to the interplay of economic, social, political, cultural, or 
ethnic factors [20, 64]. 
Within the academic research of historical European warfare, however, a 
new theoretical paradigm has been developed in the past decades to show 
how deteriorating climate profoundly affects the entire social fabric owing to 
reduced agricultural productivity and the consequent subsistence crises, 
triggering widespread popular unrest [3, 8, 12, 13, 18, 28, 32, 33, 53]. That 
paradigm is described in full in the following passage [28]: 
 
“The changing climate had [an] impact on the political 
developments in Europe. The Vikings were no longer the all 
powerful. The cities of the German Hanseatic League 
suffered economic declines. There was the Thirty-Year War, 
and Germany was devastated. Soldiers robbed and pillaged 
during the first half of the 17th century, and the people were 
on the move again. But they had no place to go, and roamed 
aimlessly as depicted by Bertolt Brecht’s play Mother 
Courage. Historians, as usual, blamed the war and warriors, 
but the warriors joined Wallenstein’s or Gustov Adof’s army 
because they could no longer farm at home. Not very many 
people were killed, but many died of starvation or epidemics 
after they were weakened by hunger. The culprit was 
obviously not so much the war, but the cold and wet climate 
of the Little Ice Age; a global cooling had devastating effects 
on the agricultural production in many parts of central and 
northern Europe.” 
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The premise of climate-war correlation is that when climatic conditions 
deteriorate over long time periods, it not only reduces agricultural and 
livestock production directly, but also reduces agricultural production indirectly 
by creating more extreme events (e.g., droughts, floods, insect infestations). 
So long as the economy of human society was dependent upon agricultural 
production, scarcity manifested itself in two causal pathways: a direct path, in 
which resource-oriented wars erupted as most of the world’s population 
struggled to satisfy the lower levels of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs [45]; and 
an indirect path, as constrained food resources and economic difficulties 
stemming from that scarcity intensified social pressures and increased the 
likelihood of war outbreaks [69]. In fact, the above insight can be traced to 
Huntington’s work the Pulse of Asia [29] a century ago. He suggests that in 
historical China, the Mongol conquests in the 13th century and Manchu 
conquests in the 17th century were primarily triggered by climate change. 
However, linking climate change to human history fell from favour because of 
the smack of environmental determinism and also due to the absence of 
quantitative evidence. In extreme cases during the early 20th century, some 
historians actually ruled out investigating natural phenomena altogether, 
regarding them as purely accidental facts unrelated to human history [55]. 
With the advances in high-resolution paleo-climate reconstructions made 
in the past decade, scholars can now re-examine the correlation between 
climate change and social stability using quantitative methods. For historical 
China, it has been demonstrated by large-N quantitative studies that more 
wars occurred in periods of cold climate, and food scarcity is the reason [15, 
35, 36, 37, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72]. In addition, the climate-war association was 
stronger in some regions than in others, a disparity attributable to regional 
geographic factors [67, 68, 70]. The above findings set a scientific benchmark 
that reinforces the climate-war correlation paradigm. For Europe, Tol and 
Wagner [65] replicated those research findings. As in the case of historical 
China, they found that wars were more prevalent during colder periods in the 
past millennium, while this relationship weakened in the industrialized era. 
Zhang et al. [73] further evidenced that climate change was the ultimate 
cause, and climate-driven economic downturn was the direct cause, of large-
scale human crises in pre-industrial Europe. Nevertheless, a focus on the 
climate-war association in Europe leaves one important issue insufficiently-
explored: is the climate-war relationship found consistently across the 
European continent? If the answer is ‘No,’ is the disparity attributable to 
regional geographic factors as in the case of historical China? In the present 
study, we sought to answer the above questions by using quantitative means 
in order to expedite the macroscopic understanding of the climate-war 
association in Europe. 
2 MATERIAL AND METHODS 
For the purposes of this study, the most important factor is the 
comprehensiveness of data sources (time span, spatial coverage, and the 
number of incidents recorded). Use of less comprehensive datasets may bias 
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the associated conclusions. The data employed in this research are detailed 
as follows: warfare data, temperature data, precipitation data. 
2.1 Warfare data 
A number of publications contains the warfare data of Europe over 
extended periods [31, 41, 62]. Still, the Conflict Catalogue [6] is believed to be 
the most comprehensive dataset for armed conflicts in Europe. The author 
has attempted to compile a dataset of all recorded violent conflicts that meet 
Richardson’s magnitude 1.5 or higher criterion (32+ deaths) in 1400–19991. 
The Conflict Catalogue is a superset of all other conflict compilations and is 
the product of the distillation of conflicts found in over 100 different books, 
articles, and on-line datasets that contain listings of wars. The books include 
encyclopaedias or handbooks of military history, compilations of major military 
battles, academic treatises, historical atlases, and historical chronologies for 
particular countries or regions. The Conflict Catalogue makes use of data 
sources in a number of languages other than English, including French, 
German, Russian, Turkish, Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. Significant effort 
has gone into resolving inconsistencies between different sources with 
respect to wars where they overlap. This is a much higher number of wars 
than has been recorded in any other publication. 
In Brecke’s Conflict Catalogue [6], the geographic breakdown of armed 
conflicts was made as follows: armed conflicts which occurred west of 15°E in 
Europe (plus Sweden and Italy) were coded in the ‘Western Europe’ category, 
while armed conflicts which occurred east of 15°E in Europe (including the 
Caucasus region) were coded in the ‘Eastern Europe’ category (Figure 1). The 
above zonation was based on the regional variation of physiographic condition 
and socio-economic context, as well as a tradeoff between precision in 
location, concordance with regional studies breakdowns, and 
comprehensibility in graphics. In the present study, the exploration of the 
regional variation of climate-war correlation across Europe was conducted in 
line with the above criteria. 
We followed the practice adopted in Tol and Wagner’s study [65] to 
compile our annual war time-series for the whole of Europe (Figure 2(b)), 
Eastern Europe (Figure 2(c)), and Western Europe (Figure 2(d)), in each case 
that the violent conflict lasted >1yr, we counted a conflict in every year that it 
raged. For instance, the Thirty Years War is recorded as a conflict for each 
year from 1618–1648. This method of compilation is believed to capture the 
frequency, duration, and to a degree, the scale of the conflicts more 
accurately. 
 
 
                                            
 
 
1 The dataset can be downloaded at http://www.int-res.com/articles/suppl 
/c056p001_supp.pdf. 
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Figure 1   Map of Europe and the delineation of Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe made according to Brecke’s Conflict Catalogue [6]. 
2.2 Temperature data 
Paleo-climatologists have employed ingenious methods to reconstruct 
the annual temperature of Europe. Some temperature reconstructions span 
>1,000yrs, but their spatial coverage is limited to only parts of Europe [12, 13, 
24, 34]. On the other hand, there are also temperature reconstructions 
covering the whole of the European continent. However, their time span is 
relatively short [42]. Recently, Guiot et al. [25] utilized 117 proxy records, 
including tree-rings, documentaries, pollen assemblages, and ice cores (the 
majority of proxy series have an annual resolution) to produce a gridded 
reconstruction of growing season (spring and summer) temperatures in 
Europe between 600–2007. The spatial area extends from 27.5°N to 72.5°N 
and from 7.5°W to 57.5°E and is demarcated into 125 grids (5° in latitude and 
longitude). Data are in °C anomalies relative to the 1961–1990 average. As 
Guiot et al.’s reconstruction [25] is the latest temperature series which covers 
the entire European continent and spans the past millennium, it was employed 
in this study. We arithmetically averaged the temperature data of the 125 
spatial grids to generate the European temperature time-series (Figure 2(a)). 
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Figure 2   Annual temperature and number of violent conflicts in 
Europe. (a) Mean annual temperature anomaly (°C) from the 1961–1990 
mean [25]. (b) Annual number of violent conflicts in the whole of Europe [6]. 
(c) Annual number of violent conflicts in Eastern Europe [6]. (d) Annual 
number of violent conflicts in Western Europe [6]. In all panels, grey lines 
represent original data, grey-shaded lines represent the long-term (linear) 
trend of the original data, and solid black lines represent the 40-yr cycle of 
the original data (elicited via Butterworth low-pass filter). Clusters of peaks of 
violent conflicts are shaded as grey stripes. 
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2.3 Precipitation data 
The number of precipitation reconstructions for the entire European 
continent is relatively small. We employed Pauling et al.’s seasonal 
precipitation reconstructions for European land areas (30–40°E and 30–71°W; 
given on a 0.5° x 0.5° resolved grid) for the years between 1500–1983 [54]. 
For the precipitation reconstructions, a large variety of long instrumental 
precipitation series, precipitation indices based on documentary evidence and 
natural proxies that are sensitive to precipitation signals (tree-ring 
chronologies, ice cores, corals and a speleothem) were used as predictors. 
The precipitation reconstruction done by Pauling et al. [54] contains data for 
each of the seasons. Because the reconstruction by Guiot et al. [25] is for 
growing season temperature alone, only growing season (spring and summer) 
precipitation was considered in this research, in order to make the assessment 
of their respective effects on wars possible. 
Our study period is delimited to 1400–1999, which maximizes the use of 
our available data. As the precipitation data is confined to 1500–1983, in the 
analysis in which the precipitation data is employed, the period covered was 
limited to 1500–1983 accordingly. Correlation, multiple regression, and 
moving correlation analyses were employed to quantitatively examine the 
climate-war relationship. Autoregressive disturbances in time-series were 
corrected by using the Prais-Winsten estimation method. The minimum level 
of significance was chosen as 0.05. 
3 ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE-WAR ASSOCIATION IN EUROPE 
Examination of climate-war association for the whole of Europe and the 
comparison of climate-war association between Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe were made in the following aspects: descriptive statistics of wars; 
temperature-war association in various lengths of cycle; temperature, 
precipitation, and wars; and temporal consistency of temperature-war 
association. 
3.1 Descriptive statistics of wars 
As shown in Table 1, there were 1,166 violent conflicts in Europe in 1400–
1999; 52.5% of them occurred in Western Europe, while the remaining 47.5% 
of them occurred in Eastern Europe. Armed conflicts in Europe were often 
short in duration. Whether in the whole of Europe, Eastern Europe, or Western 
Europe, >70% of armed conflicts were concluded within ≤ 3yrs, while >90% of 
armed conflicts ended within ≤ 8yrs. Nevertheless, there were some 
exceptional events of extended duration. In Eastern Europe, the Russo-
Crimean war in 1540–1572 spanned 33yrs; in Western Europe, warfare 
between the Netherlands and Spain in 1566–1609 spanned 44yrs. On 
average, armed conflicts in Western Europe lasted slightly longer than those 
in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the duration of armed conflicts in Western 
Europe spread out over a larger range of values. 
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Table 1. Frequency table of the duration of violent conflicts in the whole of Europe, 
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. 
Duration Whole of Europe Eastern Europe Western Europe 
    
1 447 205 242 
    
2 246 131 115 
    
3 140 67 73 
    
4 83 36 47 
    
5 61 25 36 
    
6 31 15 16 
    
7 29 15 14 
    
8 22 10 12 
    
9 20 10 10 
    
10 16 10 6 
    
11 6 2 4 
    
12 17 11 6 
    
13 5 1 4 
    
14 6 1 5 
    
15 4 1 3 
    
16 6 4 2 
    
17 3 2 1 
    
18 1 0 1 
    
19 4 2 2 
    
20 2 1 1 
    
21 3 0 3 
    
22 1 1 0 
    
25 2 2 0 
    
26 1 0 1 
    
27 2 0 2 
    
28 1 0 1 
    
30 2 1 1 
    
31 2 0 2 
    
32 1 0 1 
    
33 1 1 0 
        
44 1 0 1 
        
Total 1,166 554 612 
    
Mean 3.546 3.410 3.670 
    
Std. dev. 4.429 3.962 4.814     
 
As shown in Figure 2, the number of armed conflicts in the whole of 
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe exhibited a long-term 
downward trend. Furthermore, the downward trend in Western Europe was 
very obvious, which significantly pulled down the trend for the whole of 
Europe. In terms of the number of armed conflicts, Europe (Western Europe 
in particular) grew more peaceful. In the whole of Europe, there were five 
clusters of peaks of violent conflicts, which corresponded to the four major 
chaotic periods in European history: the Crisis of the Late Middle Ages, the 
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General Crisis of the 17th Century, the Age of Revolution, and the World Wars. 
Those clusters also coincided with periods characterized by either consistently 
low temperature (i.e., the Crisis of the Late Middle Ages), multi-decadal 
temperature drop (i.e., the General Crisis of the 17th Century, Early 18th 
century, and the World Wars), or exceptional inter-annual temperature 
variability (i.e., the Age of Revolution). The good match between temperature 
change, clusters of peaks of armed conflicts, and chaotic periods in European 
history at the continental scale confirms the notion that the complex 
interactions within and among natural and social processes are more readily 
disentangled at a large spatial scale [11, 48]. 
3.2 Temperature-war association in various lengths of cycle 
In order to address whether the climate-war relationship held consistently 
in various cycles at multi-centennial time-scale, both of the temperature and 
war time-series were smoothed by different Butterworth low-pass filters, 
ranging from 10-yr to 40-yr.2 Correlation analysis was then employed to 
measure the association between the two time-series. Results are shown in 
Table 2. 
Throughout the period 1400–1999, we found no significant correlation for 
the original annual temperature and war time-series for the whole of Europe, 
Eastern Europe, and Western Europe. Human beings are not inanimate 
objects of climatic forcing. Annual climatic stress upon land carrying capacity3 
can be largely buffered by social mechanisms such as grain storage and 
trade. There might also be threshold effects triggering certain events. A 
decline in natural resource availability may only cause conflicts after a 
threshold is crossed [57]. Hence, the climate-war relationship might not be 
apparent in the very short-term. Nevertheless, if the climate deterioration is a 
multi-decadal one, its stress upon land carrying capacity could be too big for 
the social buffering mechanisms to deal with. Therefore, the negative 
association between temperature and wars could be envisaged when both the 
temperature and war series were smoothed by a 10-yr filter. The correlations 
became strongly significant when the series were smoothed by 30-yr and 
larger filters. Briefly, the climate-war relationship in Europe is revealed to be 
more apparent in multi-decadal cycles, a finding that concurs with previous 
research findings [69]. Although the social buffering mechanisms are 
supposed to be more effective over time, rather than removing the association 
between climate change and war, they simply made the relationship evident 
over longer cycles. 
                                            
 
 
2 Further increase in the length of filters will result in unnecessary reduction of the degrees of 
freedom because the first half-cycle and last half-cycle of the smoothed data cannot be taken 
into subsequent statistical analysis. 
3 Land carrying capacity is not a fixed value due to technological improvement, but that this 
improvement does not operate on a time-scale sufficient to mitigate climate deterioration. 
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Table 2. Correlation between temperature and violent conflicts in Europe 
using different cycle lengths. 
     
Region Cycle length 1400–1999 1400–1699 1700–1999           
Whole of Europe 0-yr 0.020 –0.028 0.058 
    
10-yr –0.076 –0.122* –0.056      
 20-yr –0.110** –0.096 –0.078 
     
 30-yr –0.500*** –0.414*** –0.586*** 
     
 40-yr –0.534*** –0.420*** –0.694*** 
     
Eastern Europe 0-yr 0.002 –0.041 0.044 
    
10-yr –0.056 –0.091 –0.047 
     
 20-yr –0.016 –0.044 0.035      
 30-yr –0.448*** –0.406*** –0.477*** 
     
 40-yr –0.501*** –0.278*** –0.711*** 
     
Western Europe 0-yr 0.020 –0.004 0.041 
    
10-yr –0.057 –0.083 –0.030 
     
 20-yr –0.145*** –0.078 –0.190** 
     
 30-yr –0.262*** –0.209*** –0.346***      
 40-yr –0.193*** –0.236*** –0.252*** 
     
 
The cycles are elicited via Butterworth low-pass filter. Autoregressive disturbances in time-series 
were corrected by using the Prais-Winsten estimation method. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 
0.001 
 
We further divided the period into two equal portions, each spanning 
300yrs, for comparison. When the same statistical procedure was applied to 
the periods 1400–1699 and 1700–1999, respectively, some interesting results 
were found (Table 2). First, correlation coefficients in the 1400–1699 column 
were generally weaker than those in the 1700–1999 column (temporal 
disparity). Second, correlation coefficients for Eastern Europe were generally 
stronger than those for Western Europe (spatial disparity). 
One clue to the temporal disparity may be found in the effectiveness of 
mass migration in dissipating climatic forcing in different periods. Migration is 
an important outlet for societies faced with livelihood systems that are 
becoming unviable because of climate change and resource depletion [16, 
52]. In the early centuries of the past millennium, population density was low, 
while uninhabited or sparsely populated lands (without political boundaries) 
were still abundant in Europe. The supply of land far exceeded the demand 
[38]. When a region is characterized by low population density and a large 
amount of fertile land, the correlation between temperature and wars will be 
weak or of low significance, and vice versa [69]. During the time when cooling 
shrank the land carrying capacity, people could move to those unoccupied 
lands for subsistence. This was a mechanism of utmost importance in 
dissipating climatic forcing upon the European continent in the early centuries 
of the past millennium. This might explain why the climate-war relationship 
was generally weak in the earlier period. In the later centuries of the past 
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millennium, Europe became much more densely populated (Figure 3). As 
shown in Table 3, population grew dramatically between 1400–1699 and 
1700–1999. Established political boundaries in populated areas often limited 
mass migration [38, 47].4 Climatic forcing could no longer be dissipated by 
mass migration. The result of such mass migration, when it occurred, often 
was war [69, 73]. The absence of this important social buffering mechanism 
may explain why the climate-war relationship was strong in the later period. 
 
 
Figure 3   Population density in Europe. It is derived from McEvedy and 
Jones [46] and the unit is expressed in the number of people per km2. Data 
are smoothed by the 100-yr Butterworth low-pass filter and then sampled at 
every 25th pt (i.e., 1pt = 1yr) along the temporal dataset. 
 
The spatial disparity can be attributable to the dependency of agriculture 
in the two regions. Most pre-industrial economies had standards of living not 
much above subsistence, among that the majority of the population were 
focused on producing their means of survival. In medieval Europe, 80% of the 
labour force was employed in subsistence agriculture. However, prior to the 
Industrial Revolution (c. 1800), the economy of the nations of Western Europe 
such as Spain, France, Britain, and Holland was somehow based upon 
colonization and trade policies, rather than agriculture. Germany could join the 
western powers in the 19th century when the European economy had an 
industrial base; dependence upon climate is no longer total when trade and 
industry take the place of agriculture [28]. The gap between Eastern Europe 
                                            
 
 
4 Someone may argue that improvement in transportation since the mid-19th century has 
cheapened ocean travel and made it far safer than before, resulting in vast exodus overseas 
in 1840–1920 (~46 million persons). Nevertheless, when measured against the 
circumstances of the deeper past, the conditions that permitted such an intercontinental 
outpouring were exceptional. It is not reasonable to suppose the above migration pattern to 
recur [47]. 
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and Western Europe in terms of the level of industrial production has further 
widened since the Industrial Revolution [4]. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of the change of population density in Europe between 
1400–1699 and 1700–1999. 
     
Region Start yr End yr % of change         
 1400 1700  
    
Whole of Europe 6.17 12.35 +100.2%     
Eastern Europe 3.21 6.39 +99.1% 
    
Western Europe 11.56 23.14 +100.2% 
    
 1550 1850  
    
Whole of Europe 9.05 27.26 +201.2% 
    
Eastern Europe 4.79 17.70 +269.5% 
    
Western Europe 17.74 46.06 +159.6%     
 1699 1999  
Whole of Europe 12.31 72.74 +490.9% 
    
Eastern Europe 6.37 52.49 +724.0% 
    
Western Europe 23.09 112.23 +386.1% 
    
 1400 1999  
Whole of Europe 6.17 72.74 +1,078.9%     
Eastern Europe 3.21 52.49 +1,535.2% 
    
Western Europe 11.56 112.23 +870.8%     
 
The data is derived from McEvedy and Jones [46] and the unit is expressed in the number 
of people per km2. The percentage of change is calculated from the lower limit (1400 to 
1700) to upper limit (1400 to 1999). 
 
One point, however, is worth mentioning: the negative correlation 
between temperature and wars (smoothed by 40-yr filter) in Eastern Europe 
sprung from –0.278 (in 1400–1699) to –0.711 (in 1700–1999). This point 
should be kept in mind, and will be further explained in a later section. 
3.3 Temperature, precipitation, and wars 
Temperature and precipitation are both important climatic variables in 
determining agricultural production and, ultimately, land carrying capacity. We 
identified their respective effect upon the risk of wars in Europe via multiple 
regression analysis. Our data were each smoothed with the Butterworth low-
pass filter to remove variations on time-scales <40yrs5. The numbers of violent 
conflicts were entered as dependent variables, while temperature and 
                                            
 
 
5 In reference to the data processing methods of our previous work [69, 71, 73], our 
temperature and war data were also smoothed by a 40-yr Butterworth low-pass filter. This 
could make our associated findings more appropriate within the context of climate-war 
studies. 
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precipitation were entered as independent variables. Three regression models 
were run, including (1) Temperature; (2) Precipitation; and (3) Temperature + 
Precipitation. We assume that the progression of calendar years gives a rough 
approximation of societal development, given the social buffering 
mechanisms mentioned earlier. To isolate the effect of time on the number of 
wars, in each model, three de-trending methods were used to eliminate the 
trend from the violent conflicts, using parabolic (yr and yr2), squared (yr2), and 
cubic (yr3) terms (see [23]). Nine multiple regressions were run in total for each 
of the regions. 
For the whole of Europe (Table 4), when the time effect was controlled, 
temperature was negatively correlated with the number of violent conflicts in 
the Temperature Model. A 10% decrease in temperature resulted in a 6.4% 
increase in violent conflicts. In the Precipitation Model, however, precipitation 
failed to exhibit a significant and substantive effect on violent conflicts. In the 
Temperature + Precipitation Model, when temperature and precipitation were 
entered into the regressions together, both variables were significantly 
correlated with the number of violent conflicts, although the influence of 
temperature was revealed to be much stronger. A 10% decrease in 
temperature resulted in a 7.1% increase in violent conflicts, while a 10% 
decrease in precipitation only resulted in a 2.3% increase in violent conflicts. 
For Eastern Europe (Table 5), a 10% decrease in temperature resulted in 
a 5.4% increase in violent conflicts in the Temperature Model. On the other 
hand, a 10% increase in precipitation results in a 1.2% increase in violent 
conflicts in the Precipitation Model. Yet, in the Temperature + Precipitation 
Model, only temperature was significantly correlated with the number of violent 
conflicts. A 10% decrease in temperature resulted in a 5.6% increase in violent 
conflicts. 
For Western Europe (Table 6), a 10% decrease in temperature resulted 
in a 2.5% increase in violent conflicts in the Temperature Model. In addition, 
a 10% decrease in precipitation results in a 1.3% increase in violent conflicts 
in the Precipitation Model. In the Temperature + Precipitation Model, both 
variables were significantly correlated with the number of violent conflicts. A 
10% decrease in temperature resulted in a 3.1% increase in violent conflicts, 
while a 10% decrease in precipitation resulted in a 2.2% increase in violent 
conflicts. 
As it was found by Tol and Wagner [65], our study shows that precipitation 
exerted a weaker influence in triggering wars than temperature did for the 
whole of Europe. However, down to the regional level, the situation was a bit 
different. Our findings indicate that in Eastern Europe, temperature was much 
more important than precipitation in triggering warfare. In Western Europe, 
however, temperature and precipitation were somehow equally important in 
triggering warfare. The above disparity might be attributable to the varying 
regional climatic conditions in Eastern Europe and Western Europe. 
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Table 4. Regressions of violent conflicts on calendar year, temperature, and 
precipitation in the whole of Europe. 
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Table 5. Regressions of violent conflicts on calendar year, temperature, and 
precipitation in Eastern Europe. 
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Table 6. Regressions of violent conflicts on calendar year, temperature, and 
precipitation in Western Europe. 
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The climate of Europe varies from sub-tropical to polar. Prevailing 
westerlies (conditioned by the Azores High) bring rain from the Atlantic Ocean 
to the west, while the Siberian High brings colder, drier weather from the east. 
Subject to the above geographic settings, Eastern Europe is characterized by 
a continental climate with large annual variation in temperature due to the lack 
of significant bodies of water nearby. Relatively moderate precipitation occurs 
mostly in summer. Precipitation reaches only between 250 and 500mm 
annually [17]. Given that variability of temperature is much more profound than 
that of precipitation in Eastern Europe, the agricultural production there is 
primarily determined by temperature instead of precipitation. On the other 
hand, Western Europe is characterized by a maritime climate with moderately 
cool summers and comparatively warm winters and a narrow annual 
temperature range. It typically lacks a dry season, as precipitation is both 
adequate and reliable throughout the year [17]. Since both temperature 
variability and precipitation variability are not extreme in Western Europe, they 
play equally important roles in determining the agricultural production there. 
The above relationship is ultimately translated into the regional disparity 
regarding the influence of temperature and precipitation changes upon war 
outbreak. 
3.4 Temporal consistency of temperature-war association 
The disparity of the strength of the climate-war association between 
1400–1699 and 1700–1999 reveals that the climate-war relationship did not 
hold consistently at multi-centennial time-scale. Such inconsistency may be 
applied to a shorter time-scale. Therefore, we employed moving correlation 
analysis to further inspect the possible non-stationary relationship at multi-
decadal to centennial time-scale, in which climate variability is usually 
discussed [50]. The moving correlation window was set at a 101-pt (i.e., 1pt = 
1yr) width and moved to every 10th pt along the temporal dataset. The moving 
correlation curves (MC curves) of the whole of Europe, Eastern Europe, and 
Western Europe are shown in Figure 4. 
For the whole of Europe, all of the moving correlation coefficients were 
negative, which exceeded 99% significance (p < 0.01) (Figure 4(a)). The long-
term trend of the MC curve was headed slightly downward, which implies in 
general that the negative association between climate change and war was 
getting stronger with time. Despite the long-term downward trend, the climate-
war correlation was periodically distorted in the 1470s–1500s, 1580s–1670s, 
and 1810s–1850s. The distorted correlations were clustered in three periods, 
as opposed to being randomly scattered throughout the data. 
We proceeded to compare the MC curves of Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe. For Eastern Europe, the long-term trend of the MC curve was 
downward, while for Western Europe, the long-term trend of the MC curve was 
upward (Figure 4(b)). The long-term downward trend of the MC curve for the 
whole of Europe might be attributable to the strengthening of a negative 
climate-war correlation in Eastern Europe. The MC curves of Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe were further compared in three phases (Figure 4(b)). In 
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Phase I (before the 1670s), we found that no matter in Eastern Europe or 
Western Europe, the majority of the moving correlation coefficients were 
negatively significant at the 99% level. In addition, the association between 
temperature and war was distorted in some periods. However, the MC curve 
of Western Europe lagged behind the one of Eastern Europe by ~50yrs. In 
Phase II (1670s–1810s), all of the moving correlation coefficients for Eastern 
Europe and Western Europe were negatively significant at the 99% level. The 
MC curves of both regions basically moved in a synchronous manner. In 
Phase III (1810s afterwards), a great divergence was envisaged in which the 
MC curves of Western Europe and Eastern Europe went in opposite direction. 
In Western Europe, moving correlation coefficients ranged between weakly 
positively significant or not statistically significant. In Eastern Europe, the 
moving correlation coefficients were all negative and getting stronger with 
time. 
Given that cooler climate resulted in human catastrophes only if the 
population system had already pushed against its Malthusian constraints [35, 
36, 37, 63, 66], the disparity of MC curves between Eastern Europe and 
Western Europe might be attributable to periodic differences of population 
pressure in the two regions. To test the above hypothesis, we correlated those 
MC curves with the associated population growth rate within the periods of 
decreasing population growth rate. Statistical results show that during 
population decline, MC curves and population growth rate were in negative 
association (Table 7). This implies that the impact of cooling upon social 
stability was weakened when population pressure within societies had been 
reduced. Such a phenomenon was especially true for Eastern Europe. The 
time lag between the MC curves of Eastern Europe and Western Europe in 
Phase I could be attributable to the different timing of population decline in the 
two regions. On the other hand, the synchronous movement of MC curves 
happened in Phase II because the period was marked by steady population 
growth in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe. 
Regarding the disparity of MC curves in Phase III, another factor pertinent 
to population pressure played a part – industrialization6. Industrialization not 
only decreases human dependency on agricultural production, but also 
increases land carrying capacity. Population growth in Eastern Europe has 
surpassed that in Western Europe since the early 17th century [46], while the 
level of industrial production in Eastern Europe was lower than that in Western 
Europe in the pre-industrial period [4]. This historical regional setting made 
Eastern Europe particularly vulnerable to climate deterioration. The industrial 
take-off which resulted from the Industrial Revolution (c. 1800) has served as 
                                            
 
 
6 Industrialization is the process of social and economic change that transforms a human 
group from an agrarian society into an industrial one. It is part of a wider modernization 
process, where social change and economic development are closely related with 
technological innovation, particularly with the development of large-scale energy and 
metallurgy production. It is the extensive organization of an economy for the purpose of 
manufacturing. 
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a catalyst which further magnifies the disparity of the two regions. Although 
industrial production grew rapidly from the period 1840–1850, the rate of 
industrial growth in Eastern Europe was far below than that in Western Europe 
(Figure 5). Such an ever-widening gap between their respective levels of 
industrialization, together with the significant gap between their respective 
rates of population growth, explain not only the disparity of MC curves for 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe in Phase III, but also the significant 
increase of the negative temperature-war correlation in Eastern Europe from 
1400–1699 to 1700–1999. 
 
Figure 4   Moving correlation curve (MC curve) between temperature and 
violent conflicts in Europe. (a) The whole of Europe. The periods in which 
the climate-war relationship is distorted are shaded as grey stripes. (b) 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Correlation window, nw, is equal to 
101-pt (yr). The width of the window is indicated in the lower left-hand 
corner. All data have been smoothed by 40-yr Butterworth low-pass filter 
prior to the moving correlation analysis. In all panels, correlation is 
calculated at every 10th pt along the time series. The corresponding values 
are plotted at the centres of the window periods. Shaded lines represent the 
long-term (linear) trend of the MC curves. The thin dashed horizontal lines 
indicate the 99% confidence limit after correcting the degrees for 
autocorrelation of the time series. 
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Table 7. Correlation analysis between moving correlation curve (MC curve) 
and population growth rate within the period of decreasing population growth 
rate. 
   
 Periods of decreasing population growth rate     
Region Whole of 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Western 
Europe 
All regions 
          
Whole of Europe –0.276 –0.623** 0.055 –0.428      
Eastern Europe –0.678** –0.770*** 0.103 –0.824**      
Western Europe –0.262 –0.569* 0.070 0.105      
 
The periods of decreasing population growth rate for various European regions are listed as 
follows: Whole of Europe: 1480s–1530s, 1610s–1640s, 1830s–1850s and 1900s –1930s; 
Eastern Europe: 1480s–1620s, 1830s–1840s and 1910s–1930s; Western Europe: 1480s–
1540s, 1570s–1630s, 1830s–1850s and 1900s–1920s; all regions: 1480s–1530s, 1610s–
1620s, 1830s–1840s and 1910s–1920s. 
 
In order to match with the time-scale of the MC curve, population growth rate data (derived 
from McEvedy and Jones [46]) are smoothed by the 100-yr Butterworth low-pass filter and 
then sampled at every 10th pt (i.e., 1pt = 1yr) along the temporal dataset. Autoregressive 
disturbances in time-series were corrected by using the Prais-Winsten estimation method. 
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001 
 
 
Figure 5   Level of industrialization in Europe. It is derived from Bairoch’s 
study [4] and defined in terms of volume of industrial production per capita 
relative to the U.K. (in 1899–1901 = 100). Data points represent the 50-yr 
averaged value. Pre-industrial era is shaded as a grey strip. 
4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 Comparing our research findings with those of other studies 
Despite the difference in culture, resource endowment, and socio-political 
structure, those large-N studies consistently show that periodic cooling is a 
significant factor in triggering wars and social unrests in China [15, 35, 36, 37, 
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67, 68, 70, 71, 72], Europe [1, 65, 73], and various regions in the Northern 
Hemisphere [69, 74] over extended periods. Although the findings in the 
present study concur with those of previous studies about Europe [1, 65, 73], 
we further accentuate that the climate-war correlation varied across the 
European continent, just like the case of China. At multi-centennial time-scale, 
temperature-war correlation was stronger in Eastern Europe partly because 
of the region’s higher dependency on agriculture and partly because of the 
region’s prevalence of continental climate. At multi-decadal to centennial time-
scale, the temperature-war correlation in Europe was not stationary. It was 
periodically distorted when population pressure was released through a 
considerable decline in the rate of population growth or through 
industrialization. Furthermore, the regional disparity in terms of population 
growth rate and pace of industrialization might be responsible for the diverse 
trends and trajectories of the temperature-war correlation in Eastern Europe 
and Western Europe. 
Tol and Wagner [65] find that the climate-war relationship in Europe 
weakens in the industrialized era. Owing to social and technological 
advancement, human societies have become less dependent on agriculture 
and agricultural production has been less affected by the weather in general. 
However, our findings show that their observation is only relevant to Western 
Europe, not to Eastern Europe. In fact, because of the strengthening of the 
climate-war correlation in Eastern Europe over time, the climate-war 
relationship in the whole of Europe was also getting stronger in the long run. 
4.2 Addressing the controversies about climate-war association 
Despite the fact that the physical history of climate in Europe is presently 
known in considerable detail, climatic change is rarely integrated in grand 
historical syntheses [55]. The reluctance to discuss the issue of climatic 
change may be rooted in the prevalent view that events in the natural 
environment are not relevant to human history. Here we base on our research 
findings to address some major controversies about the climate-war link: a) if 
climate-war link can be broken by human adaptation; b) if climate-war link is 
too environmentally deterministic in a sense. 
4.2.1 Can climate-war link be broken by human adaptation? 
When facing environmental changes, humans can respond with various 
strategies such as importing foodstuffs, reducing taxes in affected area, 
planting crops that are highly resistant to cold and dry weather, improving 
cultivation skills, and so on. The above measures could help maintain social 
stability during protracted periods of cold [20]. Briefly, warfare is unlikely cause 
by deteriorating climate because of the adaptive capacity of humans. 
However, from the case of Europe, even though human societies could adapt 
to climate deterioration via social buffering mechanisms in the short run, they 
failed in the long run if the climate variability was a multi-decadal and 
continental-wide one. Hence, it may be inappropriate to focus on the short-
term success of human adaptive responses to refute the impact of climatic 
change on human societies. In addition, the term ‘adaptation’ (and the 
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consequent reduction in vulnerability to climate change) seems as if it could 
easily be extended to human collectivities. However, human history is filled 
with examples of groups that have proposed models of societal progress that 
turn out only to benefit a fraction of the population [22, 52], just like the case 
of industrialization in Europe. Our empirical results show that it only helped 
Western Europe disconnect the link from climate change to violent conflicts 
after the 1810s. 
Human agencies are always presumed to have choices in adapting to a 
wide variety of environmental conditions. Too often, adaptation is assumed to 
take place as a spontaneous, readily available, and cost-free activity. In the 
real world, the so-called ‘choices’ may be constrained by a bundle of socio-
economic and cultural factors [5]. Indeed, the capability of human societies to 
cope, adapt, or recover from the effects of climate change is shaped by the 
interaction of environmental and social forces [21]. Moreover, population 
pressure may gradually reduce the societies’ coping ability and narrow their 
coping range [22, 61]. For instance, mass migration may be a possible 
adaptive choice to risks associated with climate change. But, it is constrained 
by an increasingly populated world. Hence, human adaptations are not always 
the outcome of a selection process over which human agency has control [7, 
60]. Therefore, the complacent view that adaptation will surely solve the 
problem is a dangerous delusion. 
4.2.2 Is climate-war link too environmentally deterministic in a sense? 
Emphasizing the effect of climate change upon war is seemingly smack 
of environmental determinism. Here we emphasize that not every individual 
cases of war can be attributed to cooling. Every incident is unique and has its 
local, social, and political contexts if it is viewed in a micro-historic perspective. 
Clearly, wars can be induced by factors other than climatic change. 
Sometimes, they may simply happen at random. Nevertheless, we should 
distinguish individual cases of wars from cycles of wars. They are different 
analytical units representing different hierarchies of a problem, which should 
be addressed by different research approaches. Such a distinction in the scale 
of analysis should not be overlooked, because a sparse attention to the scale 
of analysis may result in a comparison between apples and oranges. 
In this research, the climate-war relationship is investigated in a macro-
historic perspective. We found that the correlation between climate change 
and violent conflicts was valid in terms of their multi-decadal cycles. In a 
broader perspective, as noted by Fagan [18, 19], ever since the beginnings of 
farming some 12,000yrs ago, humans’ survival depended on crop yields and 
on storing enough seed to plant for the next year. The sufficiency or 
insufficiency of food was a powerful motivator of human action. Even as late 
as the 19th century, millions of peasants lived at the subsistence level; in fact, 
the description is still applied to millions of people living in less developed 
parts of the world. Climate is, and always has been, a powerful catalyst in 
human history [18, 19]. 
On balance, a cooling climate means shorter growing seasons, and 
implies some abandonment of marginally arable land, retreat in certain areas 
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from double cropping, and reduced yields of certain crops [23]. Given that 
social stability is a function of economy in terms of agricultural production, and 
that agricultural production was significantly determined by long-term climate 
change in the past (cf. Introduction), deteriorating climate was an influential 
factor driving the multi-decadal war cycles in European history. This 
conclusion is further substantiated with empirical historical data and statistical 
analyses. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Since human societies exist in the context of certain environmental 
conditions, a changing climate that significantly alters these conditions is 
expected to have an impact on human life and society. At the heart of the 
debate over the role of climate in warfare lies the desire to provide scenarios 
of future conflict patterns under global warming [56]. The warmth after the late 
20th century is an anomalous and unprecedented event in the last millennia 
[44, 49]. Since both natural and anthropogenic forcing has been engaged, 
global temperature is expected to rise faster and faster in the foreseeable 
future [2]. It is generally believed that the warmth is a threat to human societies 
in many ways [30], while the magnitude of temperature increase has the 
potential to undermine human security and overwhelm adaptive capacities of 
societies in many world regions [59]. 
There is an ongoing debate about increased temperature and violent 
conflicts in Africa [9, 10, 26, 51]. The present study shows that the social 
instability in Europe (Eastern Europe in particular) was triggered by a cold 
climate at long-term temporal time-scale, which seems to contradict with the 
case of Africa. People may even think that our results are a plea to welcome 
global warming. However, it is worth mentioning that cooling shortens the crop 
growing season and reduces farmland area in middle and high latitudes 
(Europe) [23], while warming shortens the duration between sowing and 
harvesting and increases evapotranspiration in equatorial regions (Africa) 
[39]. Both are detrimental to agricultural productivity and subsequently human 
societies. Concerning Africa – the region adversely affected by the warmth, 
most of the countries there are underdeveloped or developing. They are 
supported by weather-sensitive agro-pastoral production system and 
characterized by inadequate capacity, economic strength, and institutional 
capabilities, and most importantly, by rapid population growth [30]. Out of the 
12 major food-insecure regions in the world, five of them locate in Africa [40]7. 
Given the vulnerability of natural and social systems of African countries to 
                                            
 
 
7 The 12 major food-insecure regions are: South Asia, China, Southeast Asia, East Africa, 
Central Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa, Central America and Caribbean, Sahel, West 
Asia, Andean region, and Brazil. Each of the regions comprises groups of countries with 
broadly similar diets and agricultural production systems and contains a notable share of the 
world’s malnourished individuals as estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) [40]. 
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climate change, the impact of climate change could prove extremely 
detrimental in the coming decades. The failure of African societies to cope 
with climate change may generate a range of security problems that will have 
dire global consequences. It can jeopardize the stability of the international 
system and rebound adversely to wealthy countries [14]. Therefore, it is 
imperative for both the academic and policy realms to understand better 
whether or not, and under what regional geographic conditions, climate 
change has contributed to violent conflicts in Africa at long-term temporal 
scale. Some scholars mention that the negative effects of inter-annual 
variability in climate may be mitigated if the relationship of direct dependence 
of African agriculturalists on climate is broken [27], just like the case of 
Western Europe presented in this study. When will it happen? Only time will 
tell. 
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